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OBLIGATIONS
H. Alston Johnson III*
LEGAL SUBROGATION OF INSURER TO INSURED'S RIGHTS UPON
PAYMENT OF CLAIM

The decision in Courtney v. Harris'perpetuates a curious
dichotomy in Louisiana law on the question of legal subrogation of an insurer to the rights of its insured against a wrongdoer upon payment of the insured's claim. One finds a series
of cases rather firmly announcing the rule that legal subrogation does not take place upon such payment, another series of
cases insisting that it does, and quite a number of pronouncements as dicta on the subject. Though there are purported
distinctions between some of these cases, it does not appear
that the differences are so significant that inconsistent rules
should obtain. In fact, it seems that legal subrogation should
be the rule and that cases holding the contrary should be disapproved.
The Courtney matter was of a very common variety. Mrs.
Courtney suffered injuries in an automobile accident, for which
it appeared that an employee of Fogleman Truck Lines (Harris) was responsible. Mr. and Mrs. Courtney brought suit
against the employee, the employer and their insurer, the husband for special medical expenses and the wife for general personal injury damages. Allstate Insurance Company, which had
paid $1,000.00 to the Courtneys under the medical payments
clause of their automobile policy, intervened to seek reimbursement for that amount. Allstate asserted that it was entitled to
be reimbursed either on the basis of conventional subrogation,
legal subrogation, an independent cause of action in tort, or
prevention of unjust enrichment.2 It seemed conceded at the
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. 355 So. 2d 1039 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1978).
2. The court concluded that there was no conventional subrogation, and the rest
of the opinion discussed legal subrogation. It did not address the theory of an independent cause of action in tort or the unjust enrichment claim.
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appellate level that no conventional subrogation had taken
place.'
Citing numerous decisions reaching conflicting results on
the question, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that legal
subrogation had not taken place and that the trial court had
properly dismissed the intervention. The court noted with approval the statement in another case' that medical payments
of the type owed by Allstate to the Courtneys "were owned by
the insured regardless of liability on the part of anyone else,
and the insurer thus was not bound with or for any other person
for those payments. Article 2161 of the Civil Code did not apply
...
" The court also opined that the rationale supporting
those decisions denying legal subrogation was that expressed
by a legal encyclopedia: "subrogation arises only in favor of one
who pays the debt of another, and not in favor of one who pays
the debt in performance of his own covenants." 6
While it is not difficult to understand why the court
reached its conclusion in light of the conflictiig jurisprudence
on the issue, it is believed that the decision reaches an unjust
result which will only serve to make this and other types of
insurance more expensive for those who purchase it. Moreover,
there appears to be ample authority in the Civil Code to support the opposite conclusion. Article 2134 in fact expresses a
rule precisely the opposite of that quoted by the court from the
legal encyclopedia:
An obligation may be discharged by any person concerned in it, such as a coobligor or a surety.
The obligation may even be discharged by a third
person no way concerned in it, provided that person act
in the name and for the discharge of the debtor, or that,
3. Obviously, a conventional subrogation is clearly the best way for an insurer
to proceed, and in fact most do so, probably because of the doubtful nature of a legal
subrogation claim. But this is additional inconvenience, paperwork and time which is
adding to the cost of insurance, perhaps unnecessarily if legal subrogation through
payment alone could be recognized.
4. Harris v. Huval Baking Co., 265 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
263 La. 103, 267 So. 2d 210 (1972).
5. 355 So. 2d at 1041.
6. Id., citing Medical Insurer's Right of Subrogation, 73 A.L.R. 3d 1140, 1148
(1976).
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if he act in his own name, he be not subrogated to the
rights of the creditor. (Emphasis added.)
It will be observed that the basic rule here is that though a
person may pay the debt of another, he is not subrogated to the
rights of the creditor. Articles 2160 and 2161 make exceptions
to that rule. Article 2160, which does not concern us here, permits parties to contract for subrogation upon a payment.7 Article 2161 lists four specific exceptions in which legal subrogation
will take place upon payment.' Pertinent to this discussion is
subparagraph (3), which reads: "Subrogation takes place of
right: . . . (3) For the benefit of him who, being bound with

others, or for others, for the payment of the debt, had an interest in discharging it."
The redactors thus provided for a special case of payment,
as to which a rule of legal subrogation was thought necessary
to grant to the person paying the debt a cause of action: if the
person paying the debt was "bound with others, or for others"
and therefore had himself an interest in discharging it. The
article is not more specific than that, and the question to be
LA. Civ. CODE art. 2160 provides:
The subrogation is conventional:
1. When the creditor, receiving his payment from a third person, subrogates
him in his rights, actions, privileges, and mortgages against the debtor; this
subrogation must be expressed and made at the same time as the payment.
2. When the debtor borrows a sum for the purpose of paying his debts, and
intending to subrogate the lender in the rights of the creditor. To make this
subrogation valid, it is necessary that the act of borrowing and the receipt be
executed in the presence of a notary and two witnesses; that, in the act of
borrowing, it be declared that the sum was borrowed to make the payment, and
that in the receipt it be declared that the payment has been made with the
money furnished for the purpose by the new creditor. That subrogation takes
place independently of the will of the creditor.
8. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2161 provides:
Subrogation takes place of right:
1. For the benefit of him who, being himself a creditor, pays another creditor,
whose claim is preferable to his by reason of his privileges or mortgages.
2. For the benefit of the purchaser of any immovable property, who employs
the price of his purchase in paying the creditors, to whom this property was
mortgaged.
3. For the benefit of him who, being bound with others, or for others, for the
payment of the debt, had an interest in discharging it.
4. For the benefit of the beneficiary heir, who has paid with his own funds the
debts of the succession.

7.
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answered in this context is whether an insurer is "bound with"
the wrongdoer to the insured, so that upon payment it is entitled of right to the insured's rights as creditor of the wrongdoer.
Some background is necessary to understand how the jurisprudential dichotomy came about. The earliest decision
usually cited for the proposition that legal subrogation does not
take place is D. R. Carroll & Co. v. New Orleans, J. & G. N.
R. R.1 Certain cotton brokers shipped cotton on the defendant
railroad, but the cotton was destroyed by fire. An insurer paid
to the consignees the amount of the loss under appropriate
policy provisions and then instituted an action against the railroad, though in the names of the brokers. In a very brief opinion
to which there were two dissents, the court said:
There was no contract between [the insurer and the railroad]; consequently there was no obligation from the one
to the other. There was no conventional subrogation from
the assured to the assurers, and there was certainly no
legal subrogation by which payment by the one entitled
them to payment from the other. The insurance company
paid the loss for which they received a premium for insuring against to the persons who suffered the same. As there
was no contract between it and the railroad company, and
as no obligation existed towards them from the railroad
company, they have no claim against it."0
These remarks, without further authority, constituted virtually
the entire reasons given by the court for its judgment. The
dissenting justices, noting that the destruction by fire made the
railroad primarily liable to the consignees unless it could exonerate itself, said:
The insurance company was bound to make good a loss
arising from a casualty against which it had expressly insured the owners. It chose to pay the indemnity and look
to the common carriers for reimbursement. If the latter
were bound to make good the loss, what difference to them
whether they paid the owners or the insurers?
9. 26 La. Ann. 447 (1874).
I0. Id.

. .

. Being
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bound to the owners to indemnify them for the loss that
occurred, and having discharged that obligation I am
clearly of the opinion the insurance company stands subrogated by law to all the rights of the owners against the
carriers, as they certainly are upon general principles of
equity. Civil Code, articles 2160, 2161."
These two positions remain the core of the dispute. Should
there be a rule of law (legal subrogation) which would require
that a proven wrongdoer eventually bear the loss caused by his
wrongdoing, by reimbursing an insurer which may have born
that loss because of a contract with the injured party? Or, on
the other hand, should the wrongdoer escape eventual responsibility for any of the loss because he had the good fortune to
injure a party who had provided for the loss through a contract
of insurance? The majority opinion seems to place great stock
in the fact that the insurance company was merely paying a
loss for which it had received a premium, and certainly one can
agree that the company should not be able to deny payment
under the policy because someone was at fault in causing the
loss. But the opinion seems to ignore the fact that if the insurance payment is made and shifting of the loss to the wrongdoer
is denied, the premium charged for that insurance must necessarily increase. This casts the loss eventually on those purchasing the insurance, and not on the wrongdoers. Such a result
should be more clearly explained, and more obviously supportable in the legislation, before it is accepted.
Some years later, the supreme court reached exactly the
opposite conclusion. In London Guarantee & Accident Insurance Co. v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R., " the plaintiff insurer had
paid $515.00 in workmen's compensation payments to an employee of its insured, allegedly injured during employment but
by the negligence of the defendant railroad. The language of
the Compensation Act at that time granted subrogation rights
to the employer, but not specifically to an insurer of the employer. 3 Arguing that the Act could nonetheless be read to
11.
12.
13.

Id. at 448-49.
153 La. 287, 95 So. 771 (1923).
Shortly thereafter, 1926 La. Acts, No. 85 added to what is now LA. R.S.

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

grant it such rights, the insurer proceeded against the railroad
for $5,000.00, the total damages the worker had allegedly suffered and could himself have recovered from the railroad, and
to which the insurer claimed to be subrogated.
The court rejected the reading of the Act that would permit the insurer to proceed for the full $5,000.00 claimed and
limited recovery to the $515.00 paid in compensation. But the
court was of the opinion that since the Act did not expressly
grant the insurer these subrogation rights, the basis for recovery had to be article 2315. The court reasoned that if the fault
of the railroad company had caused the insurer damage
($515.00 paid in compensation to the injured employee), then
the article granted the insurer the right to proceed directly
against the railroad for that amount." The insurer's alternative
argument that it was subrogated of right under article 2161(3)
was not reached in light of the court's disposition of the case
under article 2315. Other decisions about the same period of
time reached the conclusion that insurers were entitled to legal
subrogation upon payment to an insured, but there was no
discussion or citation of any significant authority.' 5 A number
of others followed the London Guarantee decision and its arti6
cle 2315 rationale.
The court's disposition of the matter under article 2315
without reaching article 2161(3), though achieving a just result,
was a fateful one. Casting the issue in terms of general tort
23:1162 (1950) a specific subrogation of the insurer to all rights of the employer under
the Act.
14. Part of the rationale was the rather famous decision of AppalachianCorp. v.
Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922), to the effect that when one of
two persons who are solidarily liable for an injury to a third person is primarily responsible because his fault was the proximate cause of the injury, and the other of the
obligors is only technically liable, the latter is entitled to indemnity from the one whose
fault caused the injury or damage.
15. Monteleone v. Royal Ins. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1563, 18 So. 472 (1895); Miller v.
Newark Fire Ins.. Co., 125 So. 150 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1929).
16. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Allen, 132 So. 2d 240 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1961);
American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Costa, 107 So. 2d 76 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1958); Lumber
Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Kemp, 102 So. 2d 248 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1958); Lumbermen's
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruiz, 77 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954); John M. Walton, Inc. v.
McManus, 67 So. 2d 130 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1953); Hansen v. Hickenbotham, 61 So.
2d 620 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1952).

1979]

WORK OF APPELLATE COURTS-1977-1978

681

principles rather than choosing the special rule of the Civil
Code intended for this precise situation was to lead to confusion. In 1957 the supreme court decided the case of ForcumJames Co. v. Duke TransportationCo.'7 The plaintiff company
had built a temporary bridge under contract to the Department
of Highways; the defendant's overweight truck damaged the
bridge. One of plaintiff's arguments in seeking recovery was
that the defendant was liable in tort for the conduct of its
driver. The court rejected this argument, reasoning that the
Department was the owner of the bridge and thus the injured
party and that the plaintiff merely stood in a contractual relationship with the Department. This was in keeping with the
rationale that the tortfeasor is liable only for proximate damages caused by his act, which would not include damages done
to a person who suffered loss only because of a contractual
relationship with the injured party. The court also rejected the
plaintiff's legal subrogation argument, noting that article 2161
contained no provision for a case of this nature.
Subsequent cases took this pronouncement to mean that
the supreme court had rejected article 2315 as a basis for a
possible cause of action by an insurer. 8 After all, it was reasoned, the insurer is merely a person who stands in a contractual relationship with the injured party, and the wrongdoer
could not be asked to respond to such a person. These cases also
saw the decision as having weakened any argument that legal
subrogation under article 2161(3) could take place, although in
fact the case merely holds that article 2161 did not apply to the
factual situation at hand."
The general principle of Forcum-James has been applied
in numerous other cases, but all of these decisions have a common thread: the person suing the wrongdoer is one whose only
claim to a cause of action is that the wrongdoer's conduct in
injuring the victim caused loss of a contractual benefit which
17. 231 La. 953, 93 So. 2d 228 (1957).
18. American Indem. Co. v. New York F. & M. Underwriters, Inc., 196 So. 2d
592 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967); McDaniel v. Hearn, 158 So. 2d 348 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1963).
19. See American Indem. Co. v. New York F. & M. Underwriters, Inc., 196 So.
2d 592 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
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would otherwise have inured to the plaintiff. 0 The statement
of law in article 2315 might well not grant a cause of action in
such a case, as a general matter. But in none of those cases
could it be said that the plaintiff was bound along with the
wrongdoer for a part of the injured person's loss and, after
having paid that part, was seeking reimbursement from the
wrongdoer. Such a case is specifically provided for in article
2161(3), and it is that article which grants to the plaintiff a
cause of action.
But the excursion into, and perhaps back out of, article
2315 was largely responsible for the dichotomy one finds in the
jurisprudence. Recent cases, relying largely upon ForcumJames, have rejected legal subrogation for insurers having paid
medical expenses; 2 1 others have permitted legal subrogation for
insurers having made payments under uninsured motorist,
property or collision coverage. 22 The announced distinction between the two lines of jurisprudence is that the insurers having
paid medical expenses are bound without regard to the fault of
anyone else, but those having paid uninsured motorist claims
or collision claims are bound "with" the wrongdoer. This seems
largely a question of semantics, since all of these insurers are
"bound" to make the agreed payments to the insured because
of the conduct of the wrongdoer who, if proven to have been at
fault, is "bound" with the insurance company for these very
same payments.
20. Desormeaux v. Central Indus., Inc., 333 So. 2d 431 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 337 So. 2d 225 (La. 1976) (no recovery for plaintiff son who had contract with
father for water, through ditch on father's property which was damaged by defendant);
Baughman Surgical Assoc., Ltd. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 302 So. 2d 316 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1974) (plaintiff professional corporation could not recover for its "loss" when
its employee physician could not work for it after injury caused by defendant); Messina
v. Sheraton Corp., 291 So. 2d 829 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974) (no recovery for promoter
of boxing match when fight was cancelled after alleged negligence of defendant hotel
injured fighter).
21. Harris v. Huval Baking Co., 265 So. 2d 783 (La. App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied,
263 La. 103, 267 So. 2d 210 (1972); American Indem. Co. v. New York F. & M.
Underwriters, Inc., 196 So. 2d 592 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1967).
22. Volume Shoe Corp. v. Armato, 341 So. 2d 611 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1977) (property loss); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Byles, 280 So. 2d 624 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1973) (uninsured motorist); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Allen, 132 So. 2d 240 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1961) (property); John M. Walton, Inc. v. McManus, 67 So. 2d 130 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1953) (collision loss).
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The source of the insurer's rights, of course, ought to be
article 2161(3), which merely requires that the insurer show
that it was "bound with others, or for others" for the amount
which it paid to the insured. There is no requirement that the
obligation shared by the insurer and the wrongdoer be solidary.
However, in PringleAssociated Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes,13 the
supreme court, in a statement which was probably dicta,
stated that if there is no solidary obligation, then there is no
subrogation.2 ' Several subsequent cases relied upon this statement as authority for rejecting an insurer's claim to legal subrogation, asserting that no solidary obligation was shown between the insurer and the wrongdoer.2 5
The resolution of this question depends upon the meaning
of "solidary obligation." The writer has observed in this forum
on other occasions that the expression may simply mean that
two persons are bound to the same individual for the same
debt, even though for different reasons. 2 The jurisprudence has
recognized this principle,2 and it certainly fits the present situation. Suppose that the issue is medical payments under an
automobile policy. Due to the occurrence of the insured risk
(injury to insured through use or operation of vehicle), the
insurer is obligated (by "contract") to pay certain medical expenses, up to a designated amount. If it is proven that a third
person (the defendant) is at fault in the occurrence of the insured risk, then he is obligated to pay those same expenses (by
"tort"). Thus the insurer is "bound with" the wrongdoer for
these expenses and is entitled to legal subrogation from the
23. 254 La. 705, 226 So. 2d 502 (1969).
24. The court stated: "Clearly this language presupposes the existence of a solidary obligation. If no solidary obligation exists, subrogation does not take place." Id.
at 741-42, 226 So. 2d at 515.
25. See, e.g., Harris v. Huval Baking Co., 265 So. 2d 783, 785 (La. App. 3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 263 La. 103, 267 So. 2d 210 (1972).
26. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1974-1975
Term-Obligations, 36 LA. L. REv. 375 (1976); The Work of the LouisianaAppellate
Courts for the 1972-1973 Term-Obligations, 34 LA. L. Rav. 231 (1974).
27. Commercial Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Wilson, 293 So. 2d 246 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1974) (imperfect solidarity will satisfy Civil Code article 2161(3); legal subrogation
found when plaintiff insurance agency and policyholder were each bound, for different
reasons and at different times, to pay the same debt to a third person, and insurance
agency paid it).
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insured to collect them from the wrongdoer. The relationship
of the insurer and the wrongdoer, as between themselves, is not
governed by the fact that they are "bound together," necessitating a conclusion that they must share the loss. Both the
jurisprudence" and the Civil Code29 recognize that, even between persons bound together to a third person for the same
debt, indemnity rather than contribution may be the rule.
Thus the insurer is entitled to collect the full amount of its loss
from the wrongdoer.
This conclusion achieves a salutary policy. The wrongdoer
is required eventually to pay the full amount of damage, just
as he would if no insurance were in the picture. Certainly he
cannot complain that he has not been accorded a reduction in
damages which he caused. The victim theoretically receives,
from the wrongdoer and from his own insurer, the full amount
of his damages. The insurer is reimbursed for a loss caused by
the fault of the wrongdoer and will theoretically reflect this
success in the calculation of premiums. Although the insured
pays for this 'coverage, the rate structure ought to reflect the
record of success of the insurer in casting this loss back on the
wrongdoer when possible; and the insured has, for his premium, received two important values: certainty and promptness of recovery, though of limited amounts.
To refuse to reach this conclusion, in the instance in which
no conventional subrogation has taken place, is to cast this loss
(on what a layman, and perhaps even a heretical lawyer, might
term a "technicality") on the insured class, which would have
to be reflected in even higher premiums on these types of insurance.
The granting of legal subrogation to an insurer in such a
case is not inconsistent with Louisiana law concerning collateral sources of reimbursement to the plaintiff, but in fact properly complements this doctrine. Some of the cases cited as
28. Appalachian Corp. v. Brooklyn Cooperage Co., 151 La. 41, 91 So. 539 (1922),
and its progeny.
29. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2106 states: "If the affair for which the debt has been
contracted in solido, concern only one of the coobligors in solido, that one is liable for
the whole debt towards the other codebtors, who, with regard to him, are considered
only as his securities."
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denying legal subrogation are in fact cases in which no insurer
is present in the litigation claiming legal subrogation. Rather,
the defendant is asserting that he should be given a deduction
in the amount payable to the injured party because a portion
of the injured party's loss has been paid by an insurer who has
become legally subrogated to the victim's rights, thus leaving
the victim without any cause of action on that amount.3 1 It is
understandable that the court will reject such an argument,
often by saying that no legal subrogation has taken place. This
is not the issue; whether it has or not is of no concern to the
wrongdoer. If it has, then he simply pays the subrogated
amount to the subrogee. If it has not, he pays it to the victim.
In neither event is he entitled to be relieved of paying it altogether.
The "collateral sources" doctrine simply serves to assure
that the defendant does not receive a windfall because the
victim has chosen to provide, by contract, other sources of
reimbursement for possible injury. The fact that we do not
permit the defendant this credit means that we recognize that
he is in fact liable for the harms so paid for by others, and to
the extent that those others properly present their claims in the
litigation, they should be reimbursed. 31 The doctrine of legal
subrogation is the proper vehicle for accomplishing this result.
30. See, e.g., Lagrue v. Murrhee, 291 So. 2d 844 (La. App. 4th Cir.), cert. denied,
294 So. 2d 829 (La. 1974); Reynolds v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 228 So. 2d 76
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 255 La. 148, 229 So. 2d 732 (1970); Warren v.
Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 99 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
31. Any possible problems of "double recovery" can be appropriately resolved
when both the subrogor (injured party) and the subrogee (insurer) are before the court.

